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In every democracy mass media play a crucial role in assuring the
e¤ective working of the political system. In this paper I focus on the
role of media as “watchdog”. In an agency relationship between politi-
cian and citizens, media perform the function of an informed supervi-
sor. Previous works have assumed that all the information available
to citizens about the incumbent politician is channelled through mass
media only. This work investigates how citizen’s voting decision and
collusion between media and politicians change if two pieces of infor-
mation about the politician are available: media information and a
good publicly supplied. My …ndings are: i) by employing both the two
signals, citizens manage to sort out honest politicians from dishonest
ones more often than if they were relying on media information only;
ii) collusion is harder to take place than in the case of one signal only;
iii) the presence of media is not always welfare improving, contrary
to previous literature …ndings. Finally, I argue that when rules at the
constitutional level are not possible and citizens cannot commit to have
less information, then collusion between media and politician can be
welfare improving for citizens.
JEL Codes D72 D73 D82 H40
Keywords Mass Media, Corruption, Selection and Discipline of Politi-
cians,
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11 Introduction
One actor in politics whose analysis has been relatively neglected by polit-
ical economy is mass media. While the literature is extensive in political
science, cultural studies or sociology, in political economy there have been
very few attempts to model the role of mass media. Outside economics, the
role of media has been interpreted broadly in two di¤erent ways. The …rst
sees media as shaping the public opinion, either by setting the agenda in
the public discourse or by “persuading”or “brainwashing” the public who
watch TV or read newspapers. While this view is held by many sociolo-
gists and/or political scientists1it lacks substantial microfoundation and it
is di¢cult to reconcile with the paradigm of the self-interested and rational
economic agent. The second view regards the media as the “watchdogs”
of the citizens. Citizens are seen as largely uninformed about the quality
and/or the performance of politicians. Media (and especially political jour-
nalists) think of themselves as acting on behalf of these citizens in order
to control public o¢cers and check their performance and quality. In the
system of checks and balances which constitutes politics mass media is the
Fourth Estate, together with Parliament, Executive and Judiciary.
This last approach can easily …t into a political economy framework.
Provided that there is a principal-agent relationship between politicians and
polity and that the citizens are less informed than the politicians, the for-
mer have an interest in evaluating the performance and/or the quality of
the latter. By assessing it, the citizens will be able to make an e¤ective
choice when deciding whether to re-elect or vote out the current incum-
bents. However, verifying the government quality can be too costly for the
single citizen. Moreover the public good characteristic of the supervising
activity would lead to a free-rider problem: the information on the ability
and/or performance of the politician will be costly to collect for a single cit-
izen, but valuable only if disseminated so that everybody will know and use
it in the electoral process. As a result the relevant information could never
be produced and released. To overcome this possible failure, a supervisor
could appear assuming the role of collecting and spreading this information.
This role of an informed supervisor is performed by mass media. Of course,
to carry out this task mass media need the right incentives. If media spread
informative news on the ability of politicians and/or their performance the
audience will increase. If more citizens buy the newspapers or watch the
news, media revenues increase both directly and indirectly (through rev-
enues from advertising, for example).
The need for supervising activity in this context is quite clear. The
job performed by politicians is highly discretional; moreover it is hard if
1Not to quote the late Sir Karl Popper, who calls for a control over TV programs and
for censorship, although for di¤erent reasons than political ones.
2not impossible to link the performance of a politician to a monetary re-
ward scheme like the ones available for private sector managers. For these
reasons politicians may be largely unconstrained and may take advantage
of this unaccountability by committing acts of corruption.2 They, for in-
stance, could deliver policies favourable to special interests or companies in
exchange of several kind of favours: …nancing their own electoral campaign,
bribes, supplying business to …rms where politicians have a …nancial inter-
est, and promising future employment in private sector. Examples abound:
among many others, the case of Enron or the diversion of IMF funds in
Russia under the previous Yeltsin’s presidency spoke for themselves.3 In
the Enron’s case, along with the company’s many failures to assure good
business conduct, there was also an example of a typical regulatory capture
between the …rm and the USA government. Enron was one of the biggest
power companies in USA and it is believed the national energy plan to re-
form the power market was heavily in‡uenced by Enron’s consultants in
order to favour the company’s market position.4Another case of politicians’
misbehaviour was the scandal of the …nancial contributions to Clinton’s sec-
ond presidential campaign. During the reelection campaign several Chinese
businessmen gave non-registered electoral funds to Clinton in exchange for
a stronger support for China joining the WTO. In all the cases above, the
case for media as watchdogs is clear: the media inquire, supervise and dis-
cover the cases of possible corruption or bribery. If they are successful, they
spread their …ndings and, given their reliability and success, they will have
more citizens buying newspapers or watching the news on TV and being
informed on the quality of their politicians. Several media compete for this
role and for the revenues generated in the media market and the adjacent
advertising one. In support of this view of the role of media, notice how
some of the cases reported above regard examples of media successfully act-
ing as watchdogs: the case of Enron was brought to public attention by The
Wall Street Journal, while The New York Times and Corriere della Sera
discovered the Russia scandals.5
In this paper I focus on the the role of media as a “watchdog”. In a
formal agency relationship between politicians and citizens, media perform
the function of an informed supervisor. Since a three tier hierarchy is con…g-
ured, the possibility of collusion between supervisor and supervisee (agent),
i.e. the incumbent politician, cannot be ruled out.
2Among many de…nitions of corruption, we choose the IMF one: “the diversion by
public o¢cials of society’s resources for personal bene…t”.
3To be more precise, in the Enron case there was a lack of control on managerial
conduct on part of shareholders, board of directors and auditing …rms.
4To make clear the extent of connections of politics and business, the former Vice -
President of USA was previously in the Board of Directors of Enron.
5The Washington Post in the Watergate scandal is another famous example of journal-
ism as watchdog of citizens. In that case the scandal did not regard …nancial corruption,
but illegal behaviour in the electoral competition.
3Previous works (among the others (Besley and Prat, 2006)) have already
analysed the role of mass media as an informed supervisor. These works have
assumed that all the information available to citizens about the incumbent
politician is channelled uniquely through mass media. However, another
strand of literature has examined how the quality and quantity of public
good supplied by the incumbent could be informative of his ability or honesty
and can help the citizens to decide whether to reelect the incumbent or not.
This work investigates how citizen’s voting decision and collusion be-
tween media and politicians change if two pieces of information about politi-
cian’s type are available: media information and public good. By not relying
exclusively on the media, citizens may be able to infer with more precision a
politician’s type without being subjected to manipulation or the concealing
of information through media capture on the part of politician. My …ndings
are that by employing both the signals available, citizens manage to sort
honest politicians from dishonest ones more often than if they were relying
on media information only. Moreover, the existence of both signals makes
collusion harder to take place than in the case of one signal only.
In addition, this paper constitutes one of the …rst attempts at endogenis-
ing the acquisition of information on the part of citizens through mass media.
In previous works voters have quite a passive role towards information: they
might receive and use information even when this might cause a decrease
in expected welfare.In this work this is not the case. I show that, by using
media in an active and strategic way, the voter might decide whether to use
information if and only if this would cause her expected utility to increase.
I prove that this decision on the part of the citizen depends critically on the
time discount factor between the two periods the game consists of: when
the time discount factor is larger than a certain threshold, it is optimal for
her to recur to media as this maximises her expected utility. When the
time discount factor is lower than the threshold, her optimal decision is to
commit not to getting information.
Finally, it is a well known result in these voting games that there is a
tension between optimality ex-ante and optimality ex-post. Even though for
the voter it may be optimal ex-ante to commit not to use any information,
once the new information is available, it is optimal for her to use it. This
argument might break the equilibria where the voter commits ex-ante to a
sort of “rational and strategic ignorance”. However, if collusion is possible
and as a result informative signals are concealed, I show that there is a cer-
tain range of parameters where collusion makes this “ignorance strategy”
credible. In this case, making collusion easier is optimal from the voter’s
utility viewpoint. This is a surprising result which contradicts most of the
literature in this …eld which sees decreasing collusion between media and
government as a positive measure of public policy. The conclusion is that
sometimes easing collusion via a decreasing of the transaction cost of corrup-
tion or through a shrinking in the media market may be welfare enhancing
4for the citizen.
My work relates to di¤erent strands of the literature on political econ-
omy, and in particular, political economy of mass media. The seminal paper
in the latter …eld is (Besley and Prat, 2006). They employ a simple model
of supervision activity in a context of hard information, where several media
outlets compete in order to provide informative news to citizens. Given that
news can only be hidden, the possible form of collusion between incumbent
politician and media is such that the latter could conceal the bad news re-
garding the former, in exchange for monetary bribes. In this way media can
in‡uence voter’s beliefs on the incumbent’s ability: as a result media could
help him to disguise his type and to be reelected. The authors …nd that
collusion between media and politicians is more di¢cult when the number
of competing media is large and when the market for news is big.
Another important contribution is (Stromberg, 2004a). In his model
mass media has the role of informing citizens about the policies delivered
by the government. If media supply most of the information citizens use
in voting decisions and there are several groups of voters to compete for,
politicians will …nd optimal to deliver policies to the largest groups of citizens
that can be reached by media, with the lowest unit cost. In presence of a
media industry technology with decreasing average costs the model predicts
that there will be a bias in the type of policies implemented: large and
unorganized groups of voters will be favoured more. (Stromberg, 2004b)
…nds empirical support for this theoretical prediction.
The previous research sees media as an institutional player which super-
vises politician’s activity or which communicates and spreads information
from the government to the citizens (top - bottom role). Another strand of
literature thinks of media as a player which insures that important social
and political issues from the public reach the politicians (bottom - up role).
Two important works here are (Besley and Burgess, 2001) and (Besley and
Burgess, 2002). They show that the existence of free and widespread media
is central in raising the salience of policy issues and the sensitivity of politi-
cians to those issues. They test this theoretical conclusion using a panel
data of Indian states and they …nd strong support for their hypothesis: the
most responsive states to economic shocks like drought, ‡ood and famine
are the ones where the newspaper circulation is higher.
This work refers also to the literature on incentives in organisation in
presence of career concerns. Classical references in this …eld are (Dewatripont
and Tirole, (1999)a) and (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999b). Their setting is
quite similar to mine, since they analyse how an outside organization (called
the market) can exploit two sources of independent information on agent’s
type, who is carrying out a task which is not contractible upon. They derive
a number of propositions on the comparative statics of di¤erent information
structures and test their robustness by considering several statistical distri-
bution of signals. However, this work di¤ers from theirs since I consider an
5institutional (and political) setting and I introduce the “player” o¤ering one
of the two pieces of information, modelling its incentives and the possibility
of collusion. Moreover, in this model one of the two signals the principal
receives is valuable for him per se and not only as a source of information
on agent’s type. This work is also related to the literature on the role of
elections as a screening and disciplining device. Classical references in this
…eld are (Coate and Morris, 1995) and (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), ch. 4.
However in these previous works, no mention of the role of media in politics
is done. Finally (Kotsogiannis and Schwager, 2006) present a model relating
policy innovation on part of politicians to information available to voters on
those policies. In their setting several jurisdictions are present where politi-
cians might experiment with new policies or not. They show that when the
information increases, voters are more able to select the honest politicians;
nevertheless the incentive to innovate decreases. This may result in the
voter’s welfare being reduced. The setting of the present paper is di¤erent
from theirs: in their paper the information to voters about policies comes
from other jurisdictions and it comes for free. In this model the informa-
tion comes from media and I explicitly model media incentives. Finally,
another important work building on the career concerns literature in the
context of political economy is the one by (Le Borgne and Lockwood, 2006).
They check whether the existence of career concerns in the sense of reelec-
tion prospect is su¢cient in promoting e¤ort on part of politicians. They
show how a modi…cation in the way politician’s e¤ort and ability interact
in the production of public good changes the incentives for the politician
and might make election not always the optimal institution as compared to
appointment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following
Section I introduce the model and the strategic situation at hand when
only citizens and government interact with each other. In Section 3 I solve
this game and highlight the existence of two e¤ects that elections have on
incumbent’s behaviour: disciplining and selecting e¤ect. In Section 4 I
conduct the welfare analysis of this model and I highlight the existence of
a con‡ict of interest between citizens and politicians depending on the time
discount parameter. In Section 5 I introduce media in the framework and
I derive the new equilibrium of the game when collusion is possible: in
particular I …nd that the disciplining e¤ect decreases when media is active,
while the sorting increases. As a special case I also derive the equilibrium
when collusion is not available to the players. In Section 6 I conduct the
welfare analysis of the game with media and stress how the con‡ict of interest
previously highlighted can be resolved when citizens demand information
endogenously, depending on whether or not this increases their expected
utility. Moreover, contrary to most of the …ndings of the literature, I …nd a
condition such that making collusion easier between media and government
increases citizen’s expected utility. Finally Section 7 concludes.
62 The Model
I employ a model of political agency between the government and the cit-
izens, where the former is the agent and the latter is the principal.6 This
modelling approach was pioneered by (Barro, 1973) and (Ferejohn, 1986).
However this …rst generation of political agency models features moral haz-
ard only: in equilibrium citizens are indi¤erent among competing politicians.
In particular, they are indi¤erent between reelecting the incumbent or not.
As a result these models are unable to highlight the fact that politicians may
di¤er among themselves in some characteristic which is relevant to voters
and upon which voters may cast their vote.
In order to be able to model this, a very recent literature in political econ-
omy has started to construct models with both moral hazard and adverse
selection. This new modelling option was …rst proposed by (Austen Smith
and Banks, 1989) and (Coate and Morris, 1995) and more recently (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000) and (Besley and Smart, 2007). In this class of models
politicians vary among themselves along some characteristic which is rele-
vant but unobservable directly to voters; moreover the politicians can take
some action in order to disguise this trait. Finally, citizens try to infer this
characteristic and make their voting behaviour contingent on it.
This model follows rather strictly the one devised by (Besley and Smart,
2007).The model has two periods t 2 f1;2g. In each period the task of the
elected politician is to produce a public good gt valuable for the citizens.
In order to produce the public good the government uses …scal resources
collected from the citizens. I make the hypothesis that there is a maximum
T of tax revenues that the government can raise in both periods. So, ￿t 2
F ￿ [0;T].
The citizens form the polity in this simple model of politics. Given
both the impossibility of politician commitment (or the non-enforceability
of electoral promises) and the non-contractibility of the output produced
by the politician, the politician’s reward cannot be made contingent on the
output level: in words, politicians are not rewarded …nancially for their
successes, as managers are in a private …rm. Instead, citizens o¤er a simple
implicit incentive scheme to the politician in the form of career concerns:
if he reveals himself as a good quality o¢cial, the incumbent is rewarded
by reelection; otherwise he is punished by being voted out and replaced by
a challenger.In this way elections perform the double task of both sorting
and disciplining politicians out. Citizens vote in a retrospective way based
on past government performance. The citizens have only one information
source to rely on to decide whether to reappoint or not the government: the
quantity of public good produced by the government. Later on I will allow
6In order to avoid confusion, from now on the politician, either incumbent (i.e. gov-
ernment) or challenger, will be referred to with the pronoun “he”, the citizen with “she”,
while media with “it”.
7for another signal coming from media to a¤ect the voting decision.
2.1 The Government
Politicians come into two types: they can either be “honest” (h) or “dis-
honest” (d). j is the random variable for the politicians’s type assuming
values in J ￿ fh;dg, with Pr(j = h) = ￿ 2 (0;1). I assume that a politi-
cian’s type represents his preferences: an honest politician does not like to
take any money out of the collected …scal revenues ￿t. As a consequence he
always maximises citizens’ welfare. On the other hand, a dishonest politi-
cian maximises the discounted sum of the funds rt diverted from the …scal
resources. This means that a dishonest incumbent maximises the following
utility function:
ud = r1 + ￿c￿r2 (1)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the time discount factor between period 1 and 2 and ￿c
is the rationally anticipated probability that the incumbent is reelected. In
other words ￿c is the probability that the citizens are going to reelect the
incumbent, with ￿￿
c as the equilibrium probability.7 As is clear from above,
the dishonest politician is completely self-interested and derives his utility
uniquely from grabbing rents when in charge of government. It is not sur-
prising how this is going to in‡uence citizens’ behaviour: given politicians’
preferences it is intuitive that citizens would like to have an honest politician
as the incumbent government rather than a dishonest one.
2.2 The Citizens
There is a continuum of voters of measure 1 in every period t: Citizens
derive their utility uniquely from the consumption of public good gt.8 They
all have the same preferences, represented by the following utility function:
uc;t = H (gt) ￿ ￿t (2)
where Hg (gt) > 0;Hgg (gt) < 0 and H (gt) satis…es the usual Inada condi-
tions, i.e. lim
gt!+1
Hg (gt) = 0 and lim
gt!0
Hg (gt) = 1.9 As already said, citizens
7We choose to consider only the monetary rents rt in the government’s utility function.
However most of the literature (see (Persson and Tabellini, 2000)) allows for an additional
term R, the so called “ego-rent”. This is interpreted as the utility the politician derives
from simply being in charge of the government. We choose not to include this ego-rent
and focus on politician’s decision regarding monetary rents rt: Nevertheless having this
additional term would not a¤ect our main results.
8In the remaining of the paper we are going to use interchangeably the two words
“citizen(s)” and “voter(s)” to refer to the same player(s) in the game.
9In our notation, the subscript in a function indicates the argument with respect to
which the derivative of the function is taken. So, for instance
@H(gt)
@gt ￿ Hg (gt).
8also act as the principal in this agency relationship: they form the polity
that is going to re-elect or vote out the incumbent at the end of the …rst pe-
riod. Based upon the available information, i.e. common knowledge of the
p.d.f. of politician’s type and the observation of the public good supplied
in period t = 1 (alternatively of the utility enjoyed), citizens will decide
whether to reelect or not the incumbent.
This represents one of the di¤erences between this paper and the model
devised in (Besley and Prat, 2006): in their paper all the information ac-
cruing to the citizen comes from the media only and the public good is
not observable by citizen.10 Moreover in their paper they do not allow for
di¤erent cost/quality in the production of the public good. Here instead,
I allow for the public good cost parameter to be randomly chosen by the
Nature and observed by the politician …rst but not by the citizen.11 Finally
there are di¤erences between the supervision technology of the media in this
paper and in theirs.
Since all citizens are alike, as they have the same preferences represented
by the utility function in eq.(2) and the same available information, the vot-
ing decision can be treated as exactly the same for everyone. I will then
restrict my analysis to the representative citizen knowing that everyone in
the polity votes in the same way as she does.12 In terms of the political
economy literature, this is a model of pure political agency, where any par-
tisan consideration is absent. In particular, the citizens and the politicians
do not have any ideological motivation in‡uencing their behaviour.
2.3 The Public Good Production Technology
In every period I assume that a single public good gt is produced, supplied
by the government and consumed by the citizens. Of course this single gt
can be thought as a bunch or amalgamate of public goods. The public good




(￿t ￿ rt) (3)
Since no borrowing or lending is allowed between the two periods, from
10Notice that (Besley and Prat, 2006) allow for a number n of media to compete on the
market for news, with n > 1: Since we want to analyse the e¤ect of having another souce
of information (the public good g) independent from the media, we limit ourselves to the
case of one media only.
11The other di¤erences are the introduction of the time discount ￿ 2 (0;1) and the fact
that the monitoring activity of the media takes place ex-ante and not ex-post.
12Of course this is an extreme case far from reality and would lead us to draw the
conclusion that the government is reelected or sent away with percentage close to 100%.
Moreover, here there is not any strategic consideration on part of any voter on the electoral
outcome; in particular the probability of being pivotal. However we choose to adopt this
shortcut hoping to enlighten the role of media in the political system, leaving aside other
considerations.
9the above it is possible to recover the budget constraint that the government
has to balance in each of the two periods:
￿t = ￿gt + rt (4)
The parameter ￿ is the cost of producing the public good gt. ￿ is a




;where ￿ > ￿ > 0; with
probability Pr(￿ = ￿) = ￿: Obviously the public good quantity gt is larger
when the cost ￿ is low, when the rents diverted are smaller, and when the tax
revenues are larger. The set G is the set of feasible public good quantities
gt: When the incumbent grabs all the rents (i.e. rt = ￿t) then gt = 0: When
rt = 0, then gt = ￿t
￿ . So the set G ￿ [0; ￿t
￿ ]:
2.4 The Game and the De…nition of Equilibrium
This two-period model consists of a game of incomplete information among
three players: incumbent politician, challenger politician, and citizen.13
In the …rst period there are …ve stages. At t = 1:0, Nature selects the
government’s type j with a random draw from the set J ￿ fh;dg with





, with Pr(￿ = ￿) = ￿ 2 (0;1). At t = 1:1, the government
observes his own type and the cost parameter ￿. At t = 1:2 the incumbent
politician decides the amount of tax revenues ￿1 to collect and how to allo-
cate them between production of public good g1 and rents appropriated r1:
The observation of tax collected and of public good by citizen (or the ‡ow of
utility coming from it) takes place at t = 1:3. At t = 1:4 an election is held,
where the incumbent is confronted by a challenger politician whose type is
unknown, but drawn independently by the Nature from the same set J and
according to the same probability distribution as the incumbent’s one. The
challenger observes his own type. Knowing the politician’s type probability
distribution and having observed the public good produced, the citizen has
to decide whether to reelect the incumbent or to vote him o¤ in favour of
the challenger. The second period comprises two stages only. At t = 2:1 the
elected politician observes a new cost parameter ￿ which is i.i.d. with the
probability distribution of the …rst period cost parameter and then has to
decide again the amount of …scal resources ￿2 to collect and how to allocate
them between public good g2 and rents r2. At t = 2:2 the game ends.
Formally in every period, having collected the level of resources ￿t; the
incumbent takes a (possibly mixed) strategy over rt 2 A ￿ [0;￿t]. However
the citizen does not observe directly the level of rents appropriated: she
observes instead the level of tax collected and of public good supplied. So
I can describe equivalently the incumbent’s strategyin terms of (￿t;gt) 2
13The …rst period of the game goes from t = 1:0 to t = 1:4. The second period starts
at t = 2:1.
10F ￿ G rather than (￿t;rt) 2 F ￿ A. A strategy for the incumbent has two
components: the …rst describes a tax collection and public good production
decision in the …rst period given the incumbent’s type j 2 J and public good
cost ￿ 2 ￿. The second component speci…es a tax collection and public good
decision in the second period, should the incumbent gets reelected. Again
this choice depends uniquely on (j;￿). A strategy for the challenger is a rule
mapping from his type and public good cost to the second period level of
taxation and production of public good: it determines a rent grabbing rule,
should the challenger get elected and replace the incumbent in running the
government.
Following the de…nition of a signaling game, I de…ne the probability
distribution function:
￿p : J ￿ ￿ ! F ￿ G (5)
I de…ne ￿p(g;￿jj;￿) 2 [0;1] as the probability that the type j, given the
cost parameter ￿; collects the amount of tax ￿ and produces the quantity g:
To simplify notation I write ￿p(g;￿jj;￿) = ￿j;￿(g;￿): With ￿p(g;￿) I indicate
the mixed strategy pro…le taken by both types of politician, irrespective of
the public good cost parameter.
A strategy for the citizen is de…ned to be a function mapping from the
information the citizen has to the probability with which she will vote for
the incumbent. The information the citizen has consists of her prior on
the incumbent’s type, the incumbent’s …rst period record, and the prior on
challenger’s type.14 So regarding the citizen’s strategy, I de…ne the following
function:
￿c : F ￿ G ! fV;NV g (6)
where fV (ote);N(ot)V (ote)g is the action space of the citizen. The citizen
conditions her action on the strategy taken by the government i.e. (￿1;g1),
the …rst period tax collected and quantity of public good. Eq.(6) de…nes
the probability density function ￿c(V j￿1;g1) 2 [0;1] which maps from the
…rst period taxation and public good quantity carried out by the incumbent
government to the probability the citizen is going to reelect him. Again to
simplify notation, I rewrite ￿c(V j￿1;g1) as ￿c (￿1;g1). When there is no fear
of generating confusion, I will write simply ￿c:
To solve this game I employ the solution concept of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. It consists of a strategy for the incumbent politician, a strategy
for the challenger and a strategy and beliefs for the citizen satisfying a num-
ber of properties. First, given the incumbent’s strategy, citizen’s beliefs are
14To economize on notation, the priors about incumbent and challenger types have been
dropped in the de…nition of eq. (6).
11consistent with it and are generated by Bayesian updating where possible,
i.e. along the equilibrium path. Second, the citizen’s strategy is consistent
with her beliefs, and optimal given the strategies of the incumbent and of the
challenger. Third, the incumbent’s strategy is optimal given citizen’s strat-
egy and beliefs and challenger’s strategy. Fourth, the challenger’s strategy
is optimal, given citizen’s strategy and beliefs and incumbent’s strategy.
3 Solving the Model
3.1 Second Period Behaviour of Politicians
In the second period, the only player called upon to move is the government,
whether the old one or the newly elected. Since there is no continuation game
and no need to signal (or disguise) his own type to be reelected, the second
period dishonest incumbent has no incentive to restrain himself: he will
collect the maximum quantity of …scal resources ￿2 = T, grab the maximum
amount of rents r2 = T and produce no public good at all, i.e. g2 = 0. As a
result citizen’s utility in the second period is uc = ￿T < 0; when a dishonest
incumbent in in charge.
On the other hand the honest incumbent will produce the optimal amount
g￿
2(￿) depending on the cost parameter ￿: More formally, the honest incum-
bent fully internalises the citizen’s decision problem: the honest politician’s
interest is completely aligned with voter’s one. Given his preferences, he
will take the same decision the voter would if she could carry out the public
good production by herself.
The programme the honest incumbent is solving is the following:
g￿ 2 ArgMax H (g2) ￿ ￿2
s:t: ￿2 = ￿g2
To solve the programme, substitute ￿2 accordingly in the expression to
be maximised, take the …rst derivative with respect to g2 and equate it to
zero: the solution to the problem is that g￿
2(￿) = H￿1
g2 (￿): Given the strict
concavity of H (g); from the theorem of the derivative of the inverse function,
it follows that g￿
2(￿) > g￿
2(￿): From the budget constraint ￿￿
2 (￿) = g￿
2(￿)￿






I write that ￿￿ = ￿￿
t (￿) = g￿







t 2 f1;2g. Notice that it is not possible to decide whether ￿￿ Q ￿￿.To
economise on notation it is useful to de…ne the following: g￿ ￿ g￿
t(￿) ;g￿ ￿
g￿







. Also notice that I assume
T > maxf￿￿;￿￿g: An important remark is that from the Envelope Theorem
12it follows that H
￿ ￿￿￿ < H￿ ￿￿￿: Obviously, I assume that H
￿ ￿￿￿ > 0.15
So, conditional on having an honest government, the citizen prefers to have
a low cost to a high cost public good environment, since the former gives
her a larger net utility.
Finally it is clear that the citizen prefers to have an honest incumbent
in the second period. In fact, in the second period the honest incumbent
will give the citizen a non-negative utility, while the dishonest will give her
a negative utility equal to ￿T:
3.2 Citizen’s First Period Strategy
Since citizen’s second period utility depends exclusively upon incumbent’s
type, her optimal strategy in the …rst period is uniquely determined by her
beliefs on politician’s type. As already said, the only way for the citizen to
infer the politician’s type is to observe the …rst period incumbent’s strategy
(￿1;g1) and update her prior beliefs on the politician being honest. I denote
with ￿(j = hj(￿1;g1)) = ￿h (￿1;g1) the citizen’s updated beliefs. Remem-
ber that Nature draws an honest type with probability Pr(j = h) = ￿;
consequently this represents citizen’s prior on the type being honest.
I already said that the voter prefers to have an honest incumbent to a
dishonest one in the second period. So if she …nds out in the …rst period
that the incumbent is honest, she will reelect him for the following term.
However, if she realizes that the …rst period incumbent is dishonest, her
optimal strategy is to vote him o¤ and replace him with a challenger of
unknown type. To see this, let us compute the citizen’s expected utility
given by a challenger of unknown type in period t, which I indicate with
ue
c;t = ￿uc;t(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc;t(d), where uc;t(h) is the welfare accruing to the
citizen in period t when the incumbent is honest and uc;t(d) is citizen’s
welfare with a dishonest incumbent. In particular:
ue




￿ ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(H￿ ￿ ￿￿)
i




￿ ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(H￿ ￿ ￿￿)
i
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T
Obviously this is larger than the utility uc;2(d) = ￿T < 0 which the voter






￿ ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(H￿ ￿ ￿￿)
i
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)T > ￿T = uc;2(d):
By simpli…ng the expression, I obtain that:
h
￿(H
￿ ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(H￿ ￿ ￿￿)
i
> ￿T
15If not there would not be any reason to carry out tax collection and public good
production on part of government.
13which is true since for any ￿ 2 ￿ : H￿ ￿ ￿￿ > 0 and ￿T < 0:
Finally when the posterior beliefs are equal to the prior, i.e. ￿h (￿1;g1)
= ￿, the citizen has not learnt anything new about the incumbent: her
posterior belief regarding the probability of the incumbent being honest
are equal to her prior, i.e. equal to ￿. If she has to appoint the challenger
politician, she knows that the new politician would have an expected honesty
equal to ￿: as a conclusion, in this case the voter is indi¤erent between
reelecting the incumbent and appointing the challenger politician. Since
she is indi¤erent, the citizen will randomise with probability ￿￿
c and 1 ￿ ￿￿
c
between electing the incumbent or not.
For clarity I can sum up citizen’s optimal strategy in the following table:
if ￿h (￿1;g1) > ￿ : ￿￿
c = 1 (7)
if ￿h (￿1;g1) < ￿ : ￿￿
c = 0 (8)
if ￿h (￿1;g1) = ￿ : ￿￿
c 2 [0;1] (9)
3.3 The Incumbent’s First Period Behaviour
The honest incumbent’s equilibrium strategy in the …rst period is the same as
in the second. Again, contingent on the true public good cost, he produces
the optimal public good quantity from the citizen’s viewpoint. Formally:
g￿ ￿ g￿(￿); for any ￿ 2 ￿. Obviously the optimal amount of tax collection
is equal to ￿￿ = g￿(￿)￿:
Since the honest incumbent plays in equilibrium with probability one
only the strategies (￿￿;g￿) or (￿￿;g￿) and this is common knowledge among
the players in the game, then the citizen can rationally attach a probability
equal to zero to the honest type playing any strategy (e ￿;e g) di¤erent from
the two above. In particular ￿h (T;0) = 0. From this it follows that the





In fact such a strategy (e ￿;e g) will give him a probability of reelection equal
to zero, as playing the strategy (T;0) does, and a utility equal (at the most)
to the entire tax revenues e ￿ < T. This means that any strategy (e ￿;e g) will
be strictly dominated by (T;0) and a rational player will never take it.
The interesting case is with the dishonest incumbent, whose interest is
opposed to the citizen’s one. While in the second period the bad incumbent
takes the unrestricted amount of rents r2 = T, in the …rst period he has to
take into account the e¤ect of his strategy on citizen’s beliefs and equilibrium
strategy. Therefore the dishonest incumbent faces a trade-o¤ between two
objectives: on one hand acting myopically, taking all the resources and being
voted out; on the other hand, forgoing part of the rents so to signal himself
as an honest type and being reelected in the second period.
Suppose the cost of public good is equal to ￿. The bad incumbent has to
decide between two strategies: i) act myopically, take the maximum amount
of rent in the …rst period r1 = T and not be reelected; ii) raise ￿￿, take zero
14rents in the …rst period, produce the quantity g￿ and get reelected in the
second period with probability ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿). Given ￿ 2 (0;1), T + 0 ￿ ￿T >
0 + ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿)￿T for any ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿): it follows that the bad incumbent will
always act myopically and play the strategy (T;0) with probability one when
the cost of public good is high. In fact a rational player will never play with
some positive probability a strictly dominated action. Notice that the bad
incumbent cannot produce a quantity g￿ when the cost is ￿: collecting ￿￿
(which amounts to announcing that the cost is ￿ ) is insu¢cient to produce
g￿ when the cost is ￿, as ￿￿ = g￿￿ < g￿￿. I can sum up the above …ndings
in the following:
Lemma 1 When the cost of public good is high, the honest incumbent raises
the amount of taxes ￿￿ and delivers g￿. The dishonest incumbent always
plays the myopic strategy.
From the previous Lemma it follows immediately that:
Corollary 2 When the cost of public good is high the dishonest incumbent
never plays (￿￿;g￿) or (￿￿;g￿).
Now suppose that the cost of public good is ￿. In this case recall that
the honest incumbent raises ￿￿ and produces the optimal amount g￿. The
bad incumbent has three strategies he can take: i) take zero rents in the
…rst period, produce the quantity g￿and be reelected in the second period
with probability ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿), where he will take the maximum amount of rents
r2 = T; ii) act myopically, take the maximum amount of rent in the …rst
period r1 = T and not be reelected; iii) collect ￿￿ and produce a quantity of
public good g￿, which allows him to be reelected in the second period with
probability ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿), and then grab r2 = T. Notice that with this last
strategy the bad politician in the …rst period grabs r1 = g￿
1(￿ ￿ ￿) = g￿
1￿￿.
Comparing the …rst and the second strategy, it is straightforward to see
that given ￿ 2 (0;1), 0+￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿)￿T < T +0￿￿T for any ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿). From
this it follows immediately that the …rst strategy is strictly dominated by the
second and a rational player will never take it. So the bad incumbent decision
is restricted to the second and the third strategy. I can then establish the
following Lemma:
Lemma 3 When the cost of public good is low, the honest incumbent raises
the amount of taxes ￿￿ and delivers g￿. The dishonest incumbent plays
the myopic strategy with some positive probability i¤ the following condition
holds:
T > g￿￿￿ + ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿)￿T
g￿￿￿ 6 (1 ￿ ￿￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿))T (10)
15If the above does not hold he will raise the quantity ￿￿ and produce the
amount g￿, while grabbing rents equal to g￿￿￿. In particular if the eq.(10)
holds with strict inequality, then ￿￿
d;￿(T;0) = 1.
Again it is useful to state the following …nding which is a direct conse-
quence of the above Lemma:
Corollary 4 When the cost of public good is low the dishonest incumbent
never plays (￿￿;g￿).
Finally the following follows directly from the honest incumbent prefer-
ences:
Lemma 5 The honest incumbent never grabs any collected …scal resources
as rents. Formally ￿￿
h(T;0) = 0.
3.4 Citizen’s Equilibrium Strategy
Given the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy I can now compute citizen’s
equilibrium beliefs. Since the honest incumbent always delivers the optimal
quantity of public good once he has collected resources, from Lemma 5
it is easy to establish that ￿h(T;0) = 0: Moreover from Corollary 2 and
Corollary 4 I can conclude that ￿h(￿￿;g￿) = 1. The interesting case is when
the strategy (￿￿;g￿) is observed in equilibrium. Let us compute the citizen’s










￿￿ + 0 + ￿￿





d;￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
In order for the incumbent to be reelected with some probability, the





d;￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
> ￿ (11)
Building on all the previous results, I can now state and prove the fol-
lowing Lemmata:
Lemma 6 Upon receiving a low public good cost, the dishonest incumbent
always plays the myopic strategy with certainty i¤ ￿ < ￿￿ =
T￿g￿￿￿
T .
16Proof. The Proof follows immediately from Lemma 3 when eq. (10) holds
with strict inequality.
Lemma 7 Upon receiving a low public good cost, the dishonest incumbent
collects ￿￿, delivers the public good g￿ and is reelected with some positive
probability ￿￿
c i¤ ￿ > 1=2 and ￿ > ￿￿ =
T￿g￿￿￿
T .
Proof. First consider the case with ￿ > 1=2. In order to show that
￿￿
d;￿ (￿￿;g￿) = 1;￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿) = 1;￿h(￿￿;g￿) > ￿ is an equilibrium, I pro-
ceed in the usual way. Fix the equilibrium beliefs ￿h(￿￿;g￿) > ￿ and derive
the equilibrium strategy consistent with them. Given ￿h(￿￿;g￿) > ￿; from
eq. (7) I know that ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿) = 1: From Lemma 3 I know that when
g￿￿￿ > (1￿￿)T; then ￿￿
d;￿(￿￿;g￿) = 1. So ￿￿
d;￿(￿￿;g￿) = 1 is an equilibrium
strategy for the incumbent given ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿) = 1. Notice that this is true if
and only if ￿ > 1￿
g￿￿￿
T : Moreover given the equilibrium strategies, from 11
it is easy to establish that ￿h(￿￿;g￿) > ￿ i¤ ￿ > 1=2.
Next consider the case with ￿ = 1=2. I want to show the existence of a
continuum of equilibria ￿￿




￿. Given the equilibrium beliefs ￿h(￿￿;g￿) = ￿, then ￿￿
d;￿ (￿￿;g￿) = 1 i¤
￿ = 1=2. Given equilibrium beliefs and incumbent equilibrium strategy, the
citizen randomizes between reelecting and not reelecting the incumbent with
such a probability that: g￿￿￿+￿￿




that this is true if and only if ￿ > ￿￿.
Finally given the equilibrium strategies, from (11) it is easy to establish
that ￿h(￿￿;g￿) = ￿ i¤ ￿ = 1=2:
So in the previous equilibrium strategy, upon receiving a public good cost
￿ = ￿, the dishonest incumbent acts as an honest one: he taxes the citizens
with the tax ￿￿, delivers the public good g￿ and is reelected with some
positive probability when both ￿ and ￿ are large enough. In particular when
￿ = 1=2 the citizen, conditional on observing the strategy (￿￿;g￿), reelects




Together with the previous equilibrium strategy, it is also possible to
construct an equilibrium in mixed strategies, where the bad incumbent ran-
domises between (￿￿;g￿) and (T;0) with probability respectively ￿￿
d;￿ and
1 ￿ ￿￿
d;￿ and, conditional on observing (￿￿;g￿); the citizen randomises be-
tween voting and not voting with probability ￿￿
c and 1￿ ￿￿
c.
Lemma 8 Upon receiving a low public good cost, the dishonest incumbent
mixes with probability ￿￿
d;￿ (￿￿;g￿) =
￿




collecting ￿￿ and delivering the public good g￿; and collecting T and deliv-
ering no public good, i¤ ￿ < 1=2 and ￿ > ￿￿ = 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T ; conditional on
producing a positive amount of public good, the dishonest incumbent is re-
elected with probability ￿￿
c =
T￿g￿￿￿
￿T < 1. There exists also a continuum
of equilibrium strategies with ￿￿
d;￿ (￿￿;g￿) 2 [0;minf
￿
1￿￿;1g] and the citizen
17reelecting the incumbent with certainty if and only if ￿ = ￿￿ for any value of
￿ 2 (0;1).
Proof. First consider the case ￿ > ￿￿ = 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T . I want to show the







￿T 2 (0;1), ￿h(￿￿;g￿) = ￿. From eq. (9) I know
that the citizen randomises between the two actions when ￿h(￿￿;g￿) = ￿. It
turns out that ￿h(￿￿;g￿) = ￿ if and only if ￿￿
d;￿ =
￿
1￿￿, where 0 <
￿
1￿￿ < 1
i¤ ￿ 2 (0;1=2): In order for the dishonest incumbent to mix between myopic
and not-myopic I know that eq. (10) has to hold with equality, i.e. g￿￿￿ =
T ￿￿￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿)T; which is true i¤ ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿) =
T￿g￿￿￿
￿T : Finally notice that
T￿g￿￿￿
￿T < 1 i¤ ￿ > ￿￿ = 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T .
Now consider the case when ￿ = ￿￿. I want to show the existence of a
continuum of equilibrium strategies with ￿￿




(￿￿;g￿) = 1, ￿h(￿￿;g￿) > ￿: Since ￿h(￿￿;g￿) > ￿; then it has to be that
￿￿
d;￿ (￿￿;g￿) 6 minf
￿
1￿￿;1g, for any value of ￿ 2 (0;1). Finally for the
dishonest incumbent to play a mixed strategy it has to be that g￿￿￿ =
T ￿ ￿￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿)T, which is true, given that ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿) = 1, i¤ ￿ = ￿￿. No-
tice that given equilibrium beliefs ￿h(￿￿;g￿) > ￿; then equilibrium strategy
￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿) = 1 is consistent with them.
Before enunciating the proposition stating the PBE of this political game,
I need to de…ne what I mean with separating, pooling and hybrid equilibria
of this game. I de…ne a separating equilibrium in pure strategies when the
two politician types take two di¤erent strategies (￿;g) and reveal themselves
in equilibrium to the voter; observing the two strategies, the voter will be
certain with probability equal to one that each strategy is taken by only one
of the two types, h or d: In turn she will reelect the honest type and vote-o¤
the dishonest incumbent. It is useful to repeat that the honest type never
takes the strategy (T;0), from Lemma 5 and the dishonest type never takes
(￿￿;g￿) from 4.
I de…ne a pooling equilibrium, when the two politician types take the
same strategy (￿;g) and so do not reveal their types in equilibrium to the
voter. Observing the only strategy along the equilibrium path and updating
her beliefs, the citizen will vote according to the rules speci…ed in eqq. (7)
- (9). Again let us stress that (￿￿;g￿) is the only common strategy the two
politicians h and d can take.
Finally a hybrid equilibrium is an equilibrium where one type takes an
action with probability one and the other randomises between two actions,
one of which similar to the other type. After updating her beliefs, con-
ditional on observing the similar action, the citizen randomises between
reelecting and not the politician taking this action. Due to (9) this is true
i¤ ￿h(￿￿;g￿) = ￿: Following the discussion above, it is obvious that in this
hybrid equilibrium the action (￿￿;g￿) taken by both types will be (￿￿;g￿);
while the other action will be (T;0).
18I am ready now to state the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 The honest incumbent always produces and taxes optimally,
for any cost of the public good. When the dishonest incumbent receives
a high cost parameter a unique separating equilibrium exists with the dis-
honest incumbent taxing the citizen with an amount T and taking maximal
rents, and the citizen voting o¤ the dishonest incumbent. When the dishon-
est incumbent receives a low cost parameter a unique separating equilibrium
￿￿
d;￿(T;0) = 1 and ￿￿
h;￿(￿￿;g￿) = 1 exists i¤ ￿ < 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T ; a unique pool-
ing equilibrium ￿￿
d;￿(￿￿;g￿) = ￿￿
h;￿(￿￿;g￿) = 1 and ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿) = 1 exists i¤
￿ > 1￿
g￿￿￿





￿T exists i¤ ￿ > 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T and ￿ = 1=2. Finally a
unique hybrid equilibrium ￿￿










￿T exists i¤ ￿ > 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T and ￿ < 1=2: More-
over there exists a continuum of hybrid equilibria with the dishonest in-




1￿￿;1g and the citizen reelecting for sure ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿) = 1
i¤ ￿ = 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T .
Proof. First I establish the …rst part of the Proposition. From Lemma 1
when the cost of the public good is high for the dishonest incumbent, he
plays the myopic strategy (T;0): From Lemma 5 we know that the honest
politician never plays this strategy. So a separating PBE is the outcome.
The same happens when the honest incumbent receives a low public good
cost ￿. His equilibrium strategy is to play (￿￿;g￿) with probability one.
On the other hand from Corollaries 2 and 4 we know that the dishonest
incumbent never plays this strategy, for any cost parameter ￿: So again
a separating equilibrium is the outcome. The only possibility left is with
the types h with cost ￿ and the type d with cost ￿. We know that upon
receiving the cost parameter ￿, the honest type plays the strategy (￿￿;g￿).
From Lemma 3 the type d with cost ￿ plays the myopic strategy i¤ ￿ <
1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T : So in this case a separating PBE is the outcome. On the other
hand from Lemma 7 we know that the type d with cost ￿ plays the strategy
(￿￿;g￿) with probability one and is reelected with certainty i¤ ￿ > 1=2 and
￿ > 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T . So in this case the outcome is a pooling PBE. Moreover
from the proof of the same Lemma 7 we know that the type d with low
cost plays with certainty the strategy (￿￿;g￿) and the citizen mixes between




￿T i¤ ￿ > 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T and ￿ = 1=2. So for this set of
parameters a continuum of pooling equilibrium exists.
To establish the part relative to the hybrid equilibrium, see that from
Lemma 8 we know that i¤ ￿ < 1=2 and ￿ > 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T the type d with
19cost ￿ mixes between the actions (￿￿;g￿) and (T;0) and is reelected with
probability equal to ￿￿
c =
T￿g￿￿￿
￿T . Given that the honest type with large
cost plays the strategy (￿￿;g￿) with certainty, we have a hybrid equilibrium.
Finally from the same Lemma 8 we can see given that the honest plays the
strategy (￿￿;g￿) a continuum of hybrid equilibria exists with the dishonest




1￿￿;1gand the citizen reelecting the incumbent with
certainty.
From the Proposition above it is possible to see that the existence of
elections works as an incentive device for the dishonest incumbent. While
the honest politician always acts in the (optimal) interest of the citizen, the
dishonest incumbent can be induced to not fully appropriate …scal resources
thanks to the existence of career concerns in the form of the possibility
of reelection. In fact, in order to persuade the citizen he is honest, he
might end up producing the quantity g￿ when the true cost of production
is ￿. This happens when two conditions are given: …rst, the dishonest
politician values the future highly enough. In this case he is willing to forgo
part of the appropriable rents in the …rst period in order to grab all the
maximum rents T in the following one. This equilibrium strategy is more
likely to be the outcome when the ratio
g￿￿￿
T is large, that is when the
rents taken in the present are a large fraction of the total amount of rents
available for grabbing. In turn this is true when the di¤erence ￿￿ between
the public good cost parameters is large. The second condition for a pooling
equilibrium in pure strategy to be the PBE is if and only if the probability
that the cost of public good is large is greater or equal to 1=2. In fact, if this
is common knowledge and the dishonest incumbent’s equilibrium strategy
is (g￿;￿￿), then it is more likely, from the voter’s point of view, that the
incumbent is of type h. In this case mimicking the honest’s behaviour is an
optimal strategy for the dishonest type.
Moreover, when the time discount is still large enough, but the prob-
ability that the public good cost is large is exactly equal to 1=2, then a
continuum of pooling equilibria exists, with the dishonest incumbent not
distinguishing himself from the honest one and taking the strategy (g￿;￿￿)
with certainty. Interestingly, not withstanding the pure strategy on part of
both incumbent’s type, the citizen mixes between reelection and not relec-




On the other hand when the probability that the cost of public good
is large is less than 1=2; a unique hybrid PBE is the equilibrium outcome.
Knowing that the probability of a high public good cost is less than half,
upon observing a (g￿;￿￿) strategy the citizen will …nd it optimal to random-
ize between reelecting the incumbent and not. In fact she will be less sure
of facing an honest incumbent. In turn, the dishonest incumbent will …nd
optimal to mix between the (g￿;￿￿) action and the myopic one.
Continuing the analysis, when the time discount parameter is exactly
20￿ = 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T a continuum of hybrid equilibria exists. In this case the
dishonest incumbent mixes between (g￿;￿￿) action and the myopic one with
a continuum of probabilities ￿￿
d;￿ 2 [0; minf
￿
1￿￿;1g] i¤ ￿ 6 1
2 and ￿￿
d;￿
2 [0;1] i¤ ￿ > 1
2. Interestingly, whatever is the mixing probability between
not-myopic and myopic action, the citizen is willing to reelect the incumbent
with certainty given that her posterior beliefs are strictly larger or at the
most equal to her prior on the incumbent’s type. Notice that even though
the equilibrium outcome is not unique for this space of parameters, all the
outcomes belong to the same class of equilibria.
Finally a separating equilibrium is the only outcome when the present
is more important than the future for the dishonest incumbent. This hap-
pens when only a small proportion of the total rents can be grabbed by the
dishonest incumbent to mimic the honest one; in turn this is true when the
di¤erence ￿￿ is small. If one interprets the uncertainty of the economic envi-
ronment as synthesized through the di¤erence in the public good costs, then
one can notice that the di¤erent politician’s quality emerges more promptly
when the “economic” environment does not show a large di¤erence. It is
when the conditions in the underlying economy are very di¤erent that the
dishonest politician has the possibility of fooling the citizen and be reelected.
As a conclusion we have seen that the prospect of reelection can act as a
“carrot” for the dishonest politician i.e. as a disciplining device: by giving
him some rents now and the possibility of grabbing more rents in the future
should he be reelected, elections work in such a way to improve citizen’s
welfare with respect to a situation when they are not available. In this
latter case, in fact, the dishonest incumbent would misbehave and take all
the available rents in any period, in the current as in the next one. So one
can conclude that the existence of career concerns contributes to improving
citizen’s welfare. Of course this works only if there is some di¤erentiation in
the politicians’ quality: in particular, it is necessary that together with the
dishonest politicians, honest politicians also exist.
However elections work also as a “stick”, i.e. as a selecting device: when
the dishonest politician reveals himself as such, then it is optimal for the
citizen not to reelect him and replace him with a challenger of expected
honesty equal to ￿.
In the next section I derive the citizen’s welfare for the equilibria of the
game above. This will enable us to highlight the e¤ect on citizen’s welfare
of the existence of career concerns for politicians. Moreover I will be able to
emphasize the existence of a con‡ict of interest between citizen and dishonest
incumbent which cannot be resolved unless another player in this political
game is introduced: media.
214 Welfare Analysis of the Game
4.1 Citizen’s Welfare and the Con‡ict between Politician
and Citizen
In the previous Section I highlighted that there exists a trade o¤ between
selecting politicians and disciplining them. When the disciplining e¤ect is at
work, the dishonest incumbent does not separate from the honest politician
but mimics him by producing a quantity of public good equal to g￿. Obvi-
ously this represents a …rst-period improvement with respect to the case of
the dishonest politician revealing himself: in fact thanks to the disciplining
e¤ect the citizen enjoys a positive utility in the …rst period. However, the
drawback of this it is that by retaining a bad incumbent in charge of the
o¢ce, the citizen will experience a negative utility in the second period.
If the dishonest incumbent reveals himself as such in the …rst period it
is better for the citizen to send him o¤, substitute with the challenger of
unkown type and enjoy a positive expected utility in the second period. This
diverse mechanism functions when the selecting e¤ect is in play: in the …rst
period the citizen loses out since she receives a negative utility; however she
gains in the second, thanks to the replacement of the dishonest incumbent
with a challenger delivering a higher expected utility.16
To assess the balance between these two e¤ects, I perform now a welfare
analysis of the equilibria of the game in Proposition 9.
In this scenario if she wants to decide her voting strategy, the citizen
can rely on the observed policies only. Remember that I have de…ned the
expected utility the citizen enjoys in every period as ue
c;t. Since the citizen’s
utility does not depend on the time period, but only on the parameters j
and ￿; I simply replace ue
c;t with ue
c = ￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d).
The expected welfare of the individual is the following:
EU(￿￿
d;￿;￿￿







cuc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d)))]+
+(1 ￿ ￿)￿[uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+







c￿uc (d) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))
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[uc (d) + ￿ (￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))] (12)
It is possible to rewrite the above expression in the following and more
16Of course when a hybrid equilibrium is the equilibrium outcome of the game described
in the previous section, there is also a mixed e¤ect, i.e. a convex combination between
selecting and disciplining e¤ect, given that the dishonest incumbent with a low cost ran-




c) = (1 + ￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] +
+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
d;￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] +
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
d;￿￿￿
c ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿
c))[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)] (13)
Following (Besley and Smart, 2007) it is useful to distinguish in eq. (13)
the following three terms to highlight the di¤erent e¤ects that elections have
on politician’s equilibrium strategy and then on citizen’s expected utility:
1. The term (1+￿)[￿uc(h)+(1￿￿)uc(d)] is the welfare that would accrue
to the citizen if elections were not an available institutional device and
politicians were replaced with certainty at the end of each term;
2. The term (1￿￿)(1￿￿)￿￿
d;￿[H
￿￿￿￿￿uc(d)] is the disciplining term, i.e.
the term indicating the increased welfare the citizen receives when the
dishonest politician mimics the honest type’s behaviour and produces
the optimal amount of public good g￿ while reaping rents equal to
g￿￿￿;
3. Finally the term ￿(1￿￿)￿(1￿(1￿￿)￿￿
d;￿￿￿
c ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿
c))[uc(h)￿uc(d)]
represents the selecting term, i.e. the term denoting the additional
welfare the citizen gets when the dishonest type is discovered, voted
o¤ and replaced with a challenger of unknown honesty.
From the expression for the expected welfare, it is interesting to notice
in the selecting term the expression ￿(1￿￿)￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿
c))[uc(h)￿uc(d)]. This
represents the cost that the citizen bears when in a hybrid equilibrium she
randomizes between reelecting and not relecting the honest incumbent who
has received the cost ￿ = ￿ and plays the strategy (g;￿) with certainty. In
this case the citizen makes a “mistake” as she is not reelecting the incumbent
she would like to: the welfare “cost” of this error is exactly equal to ￿(1 ￿
￿)￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿
c))[uc(h)￿uc(d)]: The cost of another “mistake” in the selection
of the right incumbent is expressed by the term ￿(1￿￿)￿(1￿￿)￿￿
d;￿￿￿
c[uc(h)￿
uc(d)]: this represents the reduction in expected utility the citizen su¤ers
when she reelects with probability ￿￿
c the dishonest incumbent who has
received the cost ￿ = ￿ with probability (1￿￿) and plays the strategy (g;￿)
with probability ￿￿
d;￿.
In order to evaluate which is the best strategic situation from the citizen’s
point of view, one needs to compare the welfare accruing to citizen in the
di¤erent equilibrium situations described in Proposition 9. When a pooling
equilibrium in pure strategy ￿￿
h;￿ (g;￿) = ￿￿
d;￿ (g;￿) = 1 and ￿￿
c = 1 is the
outcome then citizen’s welfare is equal to:
23EUPool = EU(￿￿
d;￿ = 1;￿￿
c = 1) = (1 + ￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] +
+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)]
On the other hand, when a separating equilibrium is the outcome, the
citizen’s utility is equal to:
EUSep = EU(￿￿
d;￿ = 0;￿￿
c = 1) =
= (1 + ￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)]
Finally, when a hybrid equilibrium ￿￿



















= (1 + ￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)]
I can now continue my analysis and rank the di¤erent levels of expected
utility the citizen receives depending on the various equilibrium outcomes
situation.
With some simple algebra it is easy to verify that EUSep > EUPool, i¤
￿(1￿￿)￿[uc(h)￿uc(d)] > (1￿￿)(1￿￿)[H
￿￿￿￿￿uc(d)]+￿(1￿￿)￿￿[uc(h)￿
uc(d)]: This is true if and only if the following condition holds:




￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)
uc(h) ￿ uc(d)
(14)
On the other hand, EUHybr > EUPool i¤ (1 ￿ ￿)￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] +
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)] > (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] + ￿￿(1 ￿
￿)￿[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)]: This holds true when ￿￿(1 ￿ 2￿)[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)] > (1 ￿
2￿)[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)]. From this, depending on the parameter value of ￿, it


















￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)
uc(h) ￿ uc(d)
(16)
Finally it is straightforward to compare the expression for EUHybr and
EUSep and determine the condition(s) such that EUHybr > EUSep. The
24previous is true i¤ (1￿￿)￿[H
￿￿￿￿￿uc(d)]+￿￿(1￿￿)(1￿￿)[uc(h)￿uc(d)]
> ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)] i.e. i¤ (1 ￿ ￿)￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] > ￿￿(1 ￿
￿)(1 ￿ 1 + ￿)[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)]; which is true i¤ the following condition holds:




￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)
uc(h) ￿ uc(d)
The last part of the welfare analysis involves computing the citizen’s
expected utility when the value of the parameters are ￿ = ￿￿ or ￿ = 1
2 and
the equilibrium outcome are the continuum of equilibria listed in Proposition
9.
When ￿ = 1
2 and ￿ > ￿￿, from Lemma 7 a continuum of equilibria
￿￿
d;￿ (￿￿;g￿) = 1;￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿) >
T￿g￿￿￿
￿T exists. By substituting these values




















c (￿￿;g￿) = 1 exists. Moreover there exists also a unique
equilibrium where ￿￿
d;￿ (￿￿;g￿) = minf
￿
1￿￿;1g, ￿￿
c (￿￿;g￿) = 1. By substi-
tuting these values in the eq. (13), and distinguishing for the value of ￿, the









c = 1) =
= (1 + ￿￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
d;￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)]+
+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿












c = 1) =
= (1 + ￿￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)]+






c = 1) =
= (1 + ￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
d;￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] +







c = 1) = EUPool =
= (1 + ￿)[￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc(d)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ uc(d)] +
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿[uc(h) ￿ uc(d)]
It is interesting to highlight the existence of a con‡ict of interest be-
tween the citizen and the dishonest incumbent with cost ￿ depending on
the space of parameters and in particular on the time discount parameter
￿.17 For instance, notice that while the politician plays a pooling equi-
librium only if he weighs the future highly enough compared to the present ￿




, the optimal decision from the citizen’s viewpoint is the
opposite. In fact for the citizen disciplining the incumbent is optimal if and




Quite intuitively if the citizen weighs the present more than the fu-
ture, then disciplining the incumbent and having him to deliver the optimal
amount of public good now is more important than deselecting and replacing
him. On the other hand, when the citizen has a long-term perspective and
weighs the future more than the present, then a separating equilibrium is
welfare improving for her. However this contrasts with the dishonest incum-
bent’s incentives: when ￿ is large enough, the dishonest politician’s optimal
strategy is to pool with the honest one.
One can …nd this type of con‡ict of interest between the citizen and the
dishonest incumbent when comparing the expected utility the citizen enjoys
when a hybrid equilibrium is the outcome with her utility when separat-
ing and pooling equilibria are the outcome.18 For instance, the (unique)
hybrid equilibrium exists only if ￿ > ￿￿ that is only if the time discount
is large enough. However, from the citizen’s viewpoint, having the incum-
bent dishonest politician mixing between revealing his type and not is better
than pooling when the time discount is small enough that is if and only if
￿ 6 ￿citizen and ￿ > 1
2.
In the examples I have described so far, the citizen’s welfare is lower than
it could be if a di¤erent amount of information information was available:
however the equilibrium of the game does not allow there to be more (less)
selecting than would be optimal from citizen’s expected utility viewpoint.
17In fact remember that the honest incumbent acts in the citizen’s interest always and
the dishonest incumbent upon receiving the cost parameter ￿ always …nds it optimal to
take the myopic action and grab the whole amount of rents r1 = T.
18In this welfare analysis for simplicity I do not consider the multliple equilibria.
26Neverthless, things would change if there was another player whom she could
resort to in order to receive information and see whether the incumbent
is honest or just pretending to be so. In the next section I am going to
introduce this additional player: media will have the role of the informed
supervisor supplying information to the citizen. Moreover, I will derive the
conditions such that its presence is useful for her.
5 Introducing Media
Having derived the equilibria of the game in Proposition 9, I now introduce
a new player in this stripped down model of politics: media. To keep things
simple, I will concentrate on the role that one single media has in the po-
litical arena.19I study the general case when collusion between media and
incumbent is possible. As a special case I derive the strategic situation when
collusion between media and politician is not available.
I think of media as an informed supervisor, that is a player (having
the role of) receiving a signal about the politico-economic environment and
sending it to the citizens.20 At least two modelling options are available:
either the media receives and sends a signal about the politician’s type or
it informs the citizens about the true cost of the public good. Both options
can be justi…ed with anecdotical evidence. However, for the sake of the
argument, I decide for the modelling choice where the media publishes news
about the cost of the public good.21 Given the present setting, this amounts
to the media publishing news about wasteful and rent-seeking activity of the
government. It is easy to show that the results derived in this Section hold
also when the media publishes news about the incumbent’s type.
I will show how the presence of media brings about more sorting and less
disciplining of politicians with respect to a situation where media is absent.
Moreover, I will highlight the conditions that make collusion between media
and incumbent harder to take place.
I assume that the setting of the supervising activity is one of hard in-
formation: signals (information about public good cost) cannot be made
up but, once received, can be concealed. This modelling of the supervis-
19For an interesting discussion about how the size of the media market and the number
of outlets in‡uence the relationship between media and government in terms of capture
and collusion, see the seminal article by (Besley and Prat, 2006).
20This signal could be seen as received by media as the product of some sort of costly
activity, for instance journalistic inquiry about government’s ability. Of course this inquiry
should be …nanced out of the revenue and then we could conduce an exercise of comparative
statics on cost and revenue structure. However as the objective of the paper is to show
how to make collusion and capture between media and government harder, I normalize
the cost of getting news to zero.
21Also, politicians’ preferences are more likely to be politicians’ private information for
any signal received by media. As such preferences are harder to detect for media than the
true cost of public good.
27ing activity is natural to assume in the case that the supervisor is a Mass
Media. In fact think of the Mass Media that observes an important piece
of information about the honesty of the politician. After learning this, the
Mass Media can decide to hide this information, maybe destroying the sup-
port of this piece of evidence (think of some documents proving that the
incumbent politician is corrupt). However, if the Mass Media decides to
reveal the learned information, the evidence supplied must be veri…able by
a third party, i.e. it must be possible to assess whether it is true or not. In
the context of this paper, this means that, for instance, other Media, or a
Court of Justice, or simply the “public” must be able to decide whther the
information shown by the Mass Media is true or false. In the jargon of the
theory of incentives, signals are veri…able but concealable. The information
structure available for the supervising activity is the following:
Pr(s = ￿jj;￿ = ￿) = ￿
Pr(s = ?jj;￿ = ￿) = 1 ￿ ￿
Pr
￿
s = ?jj;￿ = ￿
￿
= 1
The interpretation of the above information structure is the following.
When the cost of the public good is high, the media learns nothing with
probability equal to one. If the cost of the public good is low the media
receives a message saying that the cost is low with some probability ￿ 2
(0;1): With probability 1￿￿; the media does not learn anything about the
(low) public good cost.
This assumption can be justi…ed by the fact that, in Proposition 9, I
have shown that, when the cost of public good is high, both politicians
reveal their type in equilibrium. So in this case media would not provide
any additional information at all with respect to when it was not performing
its task. There is another justi…cation for employing the above information
structure in the media supervising activity.22 In fact such a structure creates
an incentive for the dishonest type with low cost only to collude with the
supervisor and conceal the signal.
I de…ne the media’s strategy as a function mapping from the information
set the media receives to the information it releases to the public. Formally
:
￿m : S ￿ f?;￿g ! f?;￿g
where ￿m(s0js) 2 [0;1] is the probability that, having received the signal
s 2 S; the media reveals to the public the signal s0 2 S.23 Given the above
information structure for supervising activity, the media’s payo¤ has the
22The above information structure is the most widely employed in the strand of literature
dealing with supervision and collusion in three-tiers hierarchy (Tirole, 1995).
23As a remark, remember that when s = ￿; s
0 2 f?;￿g. However when s = ?;s
0 2 f?g.
28following structure: when the signal the media is receiving and printing is
blank, it will have a …xed revenue from selling the news; this can be normal-
ized to zero without any loss of generality.24 In this case the news printed or
broadcast will be the usual “political chat” and it will not convey any new
knowledge about government’s type or economic environment.25 On the
other hand, when the media receives s = ￿ and reports it to the voter, this
signal will be more informative on the economic environment than the blank
signal. As a consequence it will be more valuable for the citizens in their
voting decision. In fact when observing such a signal, citizens can be sure
with probability one that the cost of public good is low. Therefore if they
observe a public good quantity di¤erent from g￿, they can conclude that the
incumbent politician is a dishonest one.Given this greater informativeness
of the signal, citizens will be willing to pay more for this information.
To model in a simple way this increased value of information for citizens,
I can think that the revenues (or the market pro…t) of the media jumps
from the normalized value of zero to M > 0 when news about the low
cost of public good is published. In this paper I do not think of media as
newspaper or pay-per-view TV and have companies o¤ering an excludable
information good. Rather, I think of free internet or broadcast TV, which
are media the citizens receive for free: in this case media pro…t comes from
advertising revenues which increases when a “scoop” is made.
Then the media’s payo¤ function in expected terms is:
um = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿M + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿M = (1 ￿ ￿)￿M
Media has a payo¤ of M with probability (1 ￿ ￿)￿ and a payo¤ of 0
with probability 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿. In order for media to have an incentive to
perform its role, this payo¤ has to be greater than the cost of information
acquisition which I have put equal to zero.26 The new timing of the game
after the introduction of media is the following: at t = 1:1:5 the media
receives the signal on public good cost s and shows it to the incumbent …rst.
Subsequently the incumbent makes a take-or-leave-it o¤er to the media to
conceal the signal and the collusive side contract is signed and executed. At
t = 1:2 the incumbent decides ￿ and the public good g: At t = 1:3; both
signals ((g￿;￿￿) and s0) reach the citizen contemporaneously. At t = 1:4;
24An alternative explanation for this could be that the media prints (and sells) several
news other than politics: e.g business news, sport, show business information, celebrity
gossip, books, movies and music review and so on. From printing/broadcasting these
non-political news media will get its normalized payo¤ of zero.
25Bayes’s rule shows that a blank signal does not add any knowledge to incumbent’s
type. In fact:





1￿￿+(1￿￿)(1￿￿)￿+1￿(1￿￿)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿)(1￿￿) = ￿ = Pr(i = h)
26See Note 19.
29the reelection decision is taken. Thereafter the game is the same as in the
case of no media.
Some comments on the chosen timing of the game are needed: I have
assumed the media shows the signal received to the incumbent …rst and then
to the citizens. Knowing the signal that media has received, the incumbent
is going to propose a side contract to the media and then carry out his
production decision.From the point of view of realism of the modeling choice,
the above timing represents a simpli…cation of a more complex situation: in
order to discover the cost of public good, media has to collect information
on this parameter. This process implies that the media and the incumbent
interact with each other and that the latter gets to know the information the
former managed to discover, i.e. the signal s 2 f?;￿g. For instance this may
be so because the dishonest incumbent is aware of the journalistic activity
the media is conducting and because this activity had the media interviewing
the politician or going on site to discover the (possibly) wasteful activity of
the public production.27
After receiving the two signals, the citizen’s modi…ed beliefs on gov-
ernment’s type are: ￿h = Pr(j = hj(￿￿;g￿(￿);s0 2 f?;￿g): Moreover the
incumbent’s strategy has now three components: together with the tax and
public good production, there is the bribe f , i.e. the “fee” the incumbent
is paying to the media in order to conceal the signal. I indicate the incum-
bent’s strategy with b ￿d;￿((￿;g)jf), and I put the superscript b in order to
distinguish the dishonest incumbent strategy when collusion is a possibility
(b ￿d;￿) from his strategy when collusion is not a possibility (￿d;￿).
In modelling the collusive activity, the existence of transaction cost has
to be considered. When a side-payment between government and media
takes place, what the payer is giving is greater than what the receiver is
getting: the di¤erence is in the transaction cost ￿ = 1
1￿￿;￿ 2 (0;1); where
￿ 2 (1;1].28 When ￿ = 0, this means that the transaction cost is zero and
the media is getting exactly what the incumbent is paying, i.e. ￿ = 1; when
￿ ! 1;￿ ! 1, i.e. the transaction cost is in…nite: then the side payment
does not take place. The parameter ￿ models the di¢culties involved in
“breaking the law” and performing corruption successfully: a high ￿ could
mean that the probability of getting caught is high as the judicial system is
e¢cient or that the transaction takes place in kind instead of money and so it
is harder to perform. The crucial point is that the transaction does not take
27A good example in this respect could be the many reports about the NHS made by
the BBC1 programme “Panorama”. Another excellent example of journalistic inquiry is a
programme on the Italian TV RAI3, called “Report” which has run several stories about
wasteful and falsely highly costly public good production carried out by the Italian o¢cials
in the public sector.
For a discussion of this assumption see (Tirole, 1995).
28In (Besley and Prat, 2006) this transaction cost ￿ is interpreted as the parameter
measuring the “media independence”.
30place frictionlessly and the costs associated with it are larger than if the same
transaction took place through the market or lawfully (see (Tirole, 1995)).I
can now state the following proposition when collusion between media and
incumbent is possible:
Proposition 10 With probability 1￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ the signal s = ? arrives and
the PBE of the game are the same as in Proposition 9. When the signal
s = ￿ arrives, a unique separating equilibrium exists with b ￿￿
d;￿(T;0) = 1 and
￿￿
h;￿(￿￿;g￿) = 1, the media playing ￿￿
m(￿) = 1 and the citizen not reelecting
the dishonest incumbent i¤ ￿ < 1￿
g￿￿￿
T + ￿M
T ; a unique pooling equilibrium
exists with b ￿￿
d;￿(￿￿;g￿j￿M) = ￿￿
h;￿(￿￿;g￿) = 1, the media playing ￿￿
m(?) = 1




and ￿ > 1=2 ; a unique hybrid equilibrium exists with ￿￿








￿T exists i¤ ￿ > 1￿
g￿￿￿
T + ￿M
T and ￿ < 1=2. Further-
more a continuum of pooling equilibrium b ￿￿
d;￿(￿￿;g￿j￿M) = ￿￿
h;￿(￿￿;g￿) = 1;
the media playing ￿￿




￿T exists i¤ ￿ > 1￿
g￿￿￿
T +￿M
T and ￿ = 1=2. Finally
a continuum of hybrid equilibrium b ￿￿
d;￿(￿￿;g￿j￿M) < 1, the citizen reelecting
the incumbent with probability ￿￿
c =
T￿g￿￿￿+￿M




and ￿ = 1=2.
Proof. Remember that I have already shown that the honest incumbent
never wants to conceal the signal and corrupt the media. So if the signal
s = ￿ arrives the honest incumbent never o¤ers a bribing contract to the
media and this one reveals the signal s0 = s = ￿ . Moreover, if the signal
s = ? arrives, the collusive activity cannot take place, since there is no
signal to hide and signals cannot be constructed. Therefore when no new
information is available (s = ?) thanks to media, the equilibria of the game
are the same as in Proposition 9, since players’ strategies and incentives
remain unchanged with respect to the no media case.
Now contingent on (d;￿) suppose the media has received and shown to
the incumbent the signal s = ￿. I am going to solve the game by backward
induction. So having solved the reelection game at stage t = 1:4; I am
solving the bargaining-collusion game between (d;￿) and the media taking
place at t = 1:1:5. In this game if the bargaining breaks down and the
collusion does not happen, the media reveals the signal to the citizens and
the dishonest incumbent plays the myopic strategy. So the players’ utility
in the disagreement point (dd;￿;dm) = (T;M). With indexes ￿ and ￿ ￿ 1;￿
2 [0;1] I represent the bargaining power of the politician and the media
respectively. I de…ne the bargaining frontier uBF
d;￿ (um) as the maximum
31utility the (d;￿) type receives, given the utility the media achieves if collusion
is successful.
Obviously the frontier depends on the PBE that is reached at a later
stage. So I am going to distinguish three cases, depending on the equilibrium
at a later stage being separating, pooling, hybrid.
Case 11 PBE is separating
Suppose that at t = 1:4 the PBE is a separating one, then the bargaining
frontier is equal to uBF
d;￿ (um) = T ￿￿um: If collusion happens, for any strictly
positive utility the media receives, the dishonest type utility is less than his
utility in the disagreement point. So in this case there is no collusion.
Case 12 PBE is pooling
Now suppose that at t = 1:4 a pooling equilibrium is the outcome and
the incumbent is reelected with probability one. In this case uBF
d;￿ (um) =
g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ ￿um. If the players collude in equilibrium, the gain from the
agreement is equal to g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ T ￿ ￿M. Of course if collusion does
not happen, then Incumbent’s utility is equal to T. In order for the col-
lusion to be feasible then it has to be g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ ￿M > T, which is
true i¤ ￿ > 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T + ￿M
T . Having characterised the elements of this bar-
gaining game, the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (ANBS) to the








T + ￿(g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ T ￿ ￿M);M + 1
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ T ￿ ￿M)
￿
:29If all






= (g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ ￿M ￿ ";M + ") with " > 0 and “small”, i.e. " ￿! 0, which
establishes the Proposition statement.
To conclude this part it remains to show that if collusion is successfully




T and ￿ > 1=2: In fact, given ￿ > 1￿
g￿￿￿
T + ￿M
T , the collusion
occurs in equilibrium, the media conceals the signal to the public and the
dishonest type d with cost ￿ takes the strategy (￿￿;g￿) with probability
one, since the payo¤ from this is greater than the payo¤ from the myopic
strategy. This follows trivially from the fact that g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ ￿M > T i¤





Let us stress how the existence of collusion does not depend on the
distribution of the gains from collusion between the parties but on their
existence, i.e. on g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ T ￿ ￿M > 0: Finally, it remains to verify
that the equilibrium beliefs are such that ￿h ((￿￿;g￿);?) > ￿ and then as a
consequence ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿) = 1.
29See for instance (Muthoo, 1999), ch. 2.8.
32In fact ￿g ((￿￿;g￿);?) =
￿￿
￿￿+(1￿￿)(1￿￿)(1￿￿)+(1￿￿)(1￿￿)￿ > ￿, which is true
i¤ ￿ > 1=2:
Obviously when ￿ < 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T + ￿M
T or ￿ < 1=2; the collusion is not
feasible in equilibrium, the signal s = ￿ reaches the public and the only
PBE at the stage t = 1:4 is a separating one.
Case 13 PBE is hybrid
Finally suppose that at t = 1:4 the PBE is hybrid. From the de…nition
of hybrid equilibrium, it follows that the dishonest type with cost ￿ is indif-
ferent between his payo¤ from pooling with the honest type who produces
and taxes (￿￿;g￿) and the separating equilibrium.
Then the bargaining frontier is equal to uBF
d;￿ (um) = g￿￿￿+￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿)￿T￿
￿um. Assuming that all the bargaining power belongs to the Incumbent,
from the de…nition of hybrid equilibrium, the Incumbent’s utility when he
corrupts the Media and produces (￿￿;g￿) has to be equal to the utility ac-
cruing to the Incumbent when he separates and does not corrupt the Media,
that is T. In turn, this is equal to the disagreement point utility the dis-
honest type obtains. Therefore in order to have a hybrid equilibrium it has
to be that g￿￿￿ + ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿)￿T ￿ ￿um = T, which is true i¤ ￿￿
c(￿￿;g￿) =
T￿g￿￿￿+￿M
￿T and ￿ >
T￿g￿￿￿+￿M
T , with the assumption that all the bargain-
ing power belongs to the Incumbent. Furthermore, in order to have a hybrid





￿, which is true i¤ ￿￿
d;￿ =
￿
1￿￿ with ￿ < 1=2.
In case ￿ = 1=2, it is easy to verify that a continuum of hybrid equi-












As a special case of the most general result derived in the above Proposi-
tion, I state the Proposition when collusion between media and supervisor is
not possible. There could be several reasons for this: the supervisor is hon-
est and it does not value the side-payment received from the incumbent; the
principal (i.e. the citizens) perfectly controls the communication between
the other two players; the external enforcer, say a Court of Justice, is pre-
venting the collusion; the transaction cost of colluding are very large (at the
limit going to in…nite), making capture of media impossible. I can formalise
all this by putting ￿ = 1. The following result is obtained immediately :
Proposition 14 With probability 1￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ the signal s = ? arrives and
the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game is the same as in Proposition
9. With probability (1 ￿ ￿)￿ the signal s = ￿ arrives and then for any ￿ and
for any ￿ 2 (0;1) the only equilibrium strategy is a separating equilibrium
with the dishonest incumbent taking the myopic strategy, the media reporting
truthfully the information and the citizen receiving the information and not
reelecting the dishonest incumbent.
33Proof. The proof is trivial once one examines what happens when ￿ = 1:
Again consider the only relevant case, that is when at t = 1:4 the equilibrium
of the reelection game is a pooling one. From the Proof of Proposition 10
we know that in this case, in order for the collusion to be feasible, then
g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ T ￿ ￿M > 0: However as ￿ ! 1; this means that for the
collusion to exist it has to be lim
￿!1 g￿￿￿ + ￿T ￿ T ￿ ￿M > 0; which is
impossible for any …nite M > 0: Since this is a contradiction, then collusion
never happens in equilibrium. As a result, the signal s ￿ ￿ is revealed in
equilibrium by the media to the citizen. Observing it, the citizen is going to
vote o¤ the incumbent. Rationally anticipating this, the incumbent plays
the myopic strategy (T;0) which reveals himself in equilibrium.
From Proposition 9 we know that when no media is around, producing a
positive and large enough quantity of public good could be su¢cient for the
dishonest incumbent to “fool” the citizen and be reelected. On the contrary,
in this new strategic situation with media, the media helps the voter avoid
being deceived. Following the terminology introduced earlier, the presence
of media increases the sorting e¤ect of elections, while the disciplining e¤ect
decreases. Proposition 10 above shows how the presence of media together
with the possibility of media capture on part of the incumbent changes the
equilibria as compared to the scenario when media is not around. This
e¤ect of media on the game equilibria is more striking when collusion is not
possible, i.e. when ￿ = 1: In this new setting with media and no collusion,
with some probability (1 ￿ ￿)￿, the cost of public good will be found to
be low and the incumbent, if dishonest, will reveal himself as such. The
citizen’s optimal strategy will be then to send-o¤ the incumbent politician
and elect the challenger, whose expected honesty is higher than the dishonest
incumbent. Anticipating all this, the best the dishonest government could
do is to “take the money and run”: he will act myopically and grab the
maximum amount of …scal resources available as rents. It is important to
stress that the incumbent politician will do so no matter what the value of
the time discount factor is. In fact, contrary to the no media scenario, there
is no incentive in terms of highly-valued future rewards that could induce
the incumbent to produce a positive quantity of public good, once he knows
the signal s = ￿ will be shown to voters and collusion is not available. In
turn this is true because once the citizen observes the signal s = ￿ she knows
that the cost is low. Contrary to Proposition 9, there is no other way the
incumbent could persuade the voter that the public good cost is di¤erent
from low. In terms of the trade o¤ between e¤ects, the sorting e¤ect is
maximised, while the disciplining e¤ect disappears.
What it is at work here is a sort of cross-checking strategy on the part of
voters: if the citizen observes that the quantity of public good corresponds
to high cost, then she will look at the media. If no informative news is
reported, then she will reelects the incumbent. However if the news headlines
34contradict the situation she is observing, then she will vote the incumbent
out.
While in the no-collusion scenario the only possible optimal strategy for
the dishonest incumbent is to reap all the rents and reveal himself in equi-
librium, now in the media collusion scenario he has another option: he can
bribe the media and deliver the optimal quantity of public good which the
citizen expects in a high cost public good environment. If he does this, he
knows the citizen will reelect him for sure, given that there is no hybrid equi-
librium in this case. As regarding the sorting vs disciplining e¤ect, here this
trade-o¤ is partially restored. When the collusion between the media and
the incumbent takes place, then the dishonest incumbent delivers a quan-
tity of public good larger than he would have done if there was no collusion.
Again this is good in the …rst period as the citizen’s utility is higher than
it would have been if separation was the outcome. Neverthless, retaining
the dishonest incumbent decreases the citizen’s welfare in the second period.
In the next section I am going to assess the welfare e¤ect of this trade o¤
between the disciplining and the sorting e¤ect of media.
Once media capture is a possibility, it is useful to focus on the determi-
nants which make it harder for collusion to take place. First, the existence
of transaction costs. It is obvious that the larger are the transaction costs,
the harder it will be to perform collusion successfully. High transaction costs
could be due to the existence and the e¤ective enforcement of a legislation
against the corruption; to an e¢cient judiciary system which is ready to go
after any wrongdoing; and to social values and culture that make corrup-
tion a practice di¢cult to be carried out. So a winning strategy to avoid
media capture on part of the government is to raise the transaction costs,
for instance by empowering the judiciary system.
The other determinant of a low level of collusion between media and
politician is the size of the market for media. Remember that in order to
prevent the signal being transmitted to the public at large, the incumbent
has to pay the media at least ￿M, that is the whole value of the market for
media when an informative signal has arrived. For the incumbent politician
colluding with the media will be harder the larger the market for media is. In
fact for the politician it will be di¢cult to bribe the media when the amount
of money that he needs to transfer in order to conceal the signal is large. So
an active and informed citizenship, one which consumes a large amount of
information channeled through mass media, makes media capture on part of
government more di¢cult. At the limit, collusion will be impossible when
￿M > g￿(￿)￿￿ ￿ T + ￿T; which is more likely when ￿M is large and when
the RHS is small. Notice that this happens when each of the addenda of the
RHS is small: in particular when there are few rents available for grabbing
now (g￿(￿)￿￿), when the resources available for grabbing are very large
(T large) and when the future resources available to pocket are largely
discounted (￿ small).
356 Welfare Analysis
6.1 No Collusion between Media and Incumbent
In Section 4.1 I have characterised a con‡ict of interest between a dishon-
est incumbent and the citizen: given a certain time discount factor ￿; the
citizen might …nd optimal a certain politician’s strategy, di¤erent from his
equilibrium one. I have stressed how in that scenario the citizen had to ac-
cept the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy. However thanks to the presence
of media, now she can now make good use of it in order to receive useful
information about the incumbent’s type. By comparing Proposition 9 and
the condition expressed in eq. (14) it is possible to clarify when it is optimal
to resort to media for the citizen, i.e. when more information increases the
citizen’s expected utility. Remember that we have established in Proposi-
tion 9 that a separating equilibrium exists only if ￿ is small enough and in
particular smaller than ￿￿ = 1 ￿
g￿￿￿
T . Moreover in the welfare analysis of
this strategic situation we have seen that more selecting increases the cit-






The following pictures will help to explain:
[Insert Pictures 1 and 2 about here]






uc(h)￿uc(d) = ￿citizen, while in the











there is no alignment of interests between citizen and politician. Since the
future is not so important relative to the present, the citizen would like the
dishonest incumbent to mimic the honest one and to deliver the optimal
quantity of public good g￿: However the dishonest incumbent does not have
such an incentive to do so: since he discounts the future rents highly, he
prefers to grab the present rents and reveal himself in equilibrium. Given
the constraints on the instruments available to the citizen and in particular
the unavailibility of contracts, there is no way she can induce the politician









, there is an alignment
of interest between the incumbent and the citizen. When ￿￿ < ￿citizen, then
for any ￿ 2
￿
￿￿;￿citizen￿
both players …nd a pooling equilibrium optimal.




dishonest incumbent with low public cost and the citizen …nd it optimal to
have a separating equilibrium. In this intermediate range of parameters both
players agree on what is the best course of action. As a consequence there
is no need for the citizen to act in order to change politician’s equilibrium
strategy.







the dishonest incumbent with
low public good cost has an incentive to mimic the good one. On the other
36hand citizen’s interest is the opposite to the incumbent’s one: the citizen
would like to sort out the honest politician from the dishonest one. In fact
now that the future is very important, having in place a honest politician






there was nothing she could do to align the in-
cumbent politician’s one to her interest, now the citizen could resort to the
introduction and the use of media. Thanks to its presence, with some posi-
tive probability she will …nd out the true cost of the good publicly provided
and the politician quality will be revealed. Let us recall that the media
is there because citizens enjoy other news than political informative ones:
however when scoops break the headlines citizens enjoy the informative con-
tent of these media. This means that the citizen will be able to sort out the
honest from the dishonest politician and in this way increase her expected
welfare. The existence of another institutional player, i.e. the media, and
the fact that the citizen …nds it optimal to receive informative news to sort
politicians out, manages to improve her expected utility with respect to a
situation where media is absent. It is also possible to derive the expres-
sion for the expected utility of the citizen when the mass media is present.
Modifying the expression in eq. (12) this is equal to:
EU(￿￿
d;￿;￿￿








c)￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+
+(1 ￿ ￿)￿[uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+
+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿[uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+







c￿uc (d) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))
i
+
+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿
d;￿)[uc (d) + ￿ (￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]
By comparing the expression above with the expression in eq. (12) one
can derive the condition such that the citizen’s utility when there media
is larger than the citizen’s utility when there is no additional information
coming from media.











(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿[uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+







c￿uc (d) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))
i
+
+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿
d;￿)[uc (d) + ￿ (￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))] >
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cuc (d) + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]
In the above expression the LHS represents the welfare accruing to the
citizen once he has received the information that the incumbent is dishonest
(or better that the public good cost is ￿ and therefore the dishonest incum-
bent cannot produce the minimum public good quantity H
￿) and that he is
voting out him and appointing a new incumbent of unknown quality. On the
other hand, the RHS represents the total citizen’s utility when he observes
a public good quantity H
￿and therefore mixes between reeleecting and not
the incumbent with any probability ￿￿
c. Therefore, while the LHS represents
the citizen’s utility of selecting the incumbent, the RHS shows the citizen’s
welfare of disciplining him. It is straightforward to see that it is not obvious
that one e¤ect dominates the other, what I have already found above.
To see this better, following (Besley and Smart, 2007), and rearranging
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c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]
￿￿￿













Therefore one can see that the e¤ect on the citizen’s utility coming from
selecting the incumbent dominates the e¤ect on the citzen’s utility com-
ing from disciplining him when the time discount is large (the future is
discounted less heavily with respect to the present), the probability of hav-
ing honest incumbents is large (there is more chance of drawing a honest
incumbent when appointing a new one, after deselecting the old) and the
probability of reelecting the incumbent is large.
It is worth highlighting the di¤erences with the previous literature: while
in previous works about mass media and political economy the supervising
role of mass media is always deemed and shown to be welfare improving, here
I derive a …rst attempt in making precise the conditions such that the o¤er
and the demand for political news is optimal for the polity. Crucially, I show
that the utility of information for citizens depends on the time discount fac-
tor ￿. So media are useful if and only if the time discount factor of the polity
is large enough, i.e. if and only if citizens value the future highly.Citizens
38know that only when the time discount factor is large enough, the supervis-
ing activity of media is optimal in order to have more information and to
sort incumbents out according to their honesty trait. In other cases either
politicians separate without recurring to media or they pool but this is opti-
mal ex-ante for citizens as well. Therefore I want to stress that by allowing
media to operate in some circumstances rather than others, citizens can de-
cide when receiving information and when not to. Indeed in some cases it
is optimal for citizens to avoid to have too much information in order to
increase their expected utility.
However, in circumstances such as these it is crucial that the citizen
can credibly commit ex-ante not to receive any information. Take the case
when the parameters are such that ￿ 2
￿
￿￿;￿citizen￿
. In this environment it
would be optimal ex-ante for both incumbent and citizens that the dishonest
politician pooled with the honest one. However ex-post (i.e. after the
incumbent has made his public good production decision) it is optimal for
the citizen to receive information. If the media anticipates this, it would be
optimal for this player to release the information and then for the incumbent
to receive it. In turn, if the dishonest politician correctly conjectures this, it
would be optimal for him not to pool and to reveal himself in equilibrium.
This would cause a shift from a pooling equilibrium (in the scenario without
media or with media and commitment) to a separating equilibrium (in the
scenario with media and no commitment): a Pareto inferior equilibrium for
both players with respect to the …rst one.
While I cannot claim to have endogenised the news exchange since this
would require a fully ‡edged theory of information acquisition which would
have to consider the public good element of this decision, I can say that
my analysis sheds some light on the necessary conditions that such a theory
would require. In fact rational agents would have to acquire information
only if it was optimal to do so and I have shown this would require the time
discount factor between the two periods to be large enough.
Another alternative interpretation of the above discussion is that I have
devised the conditions that at the “constitutional” level have to be satis…ed
in order for the media to operate optimally in the citizens’ interest. Following
the approach of, among others (La¤ont, 2000), the benevolent Founding
Fathers which draw up any Constitution know and have to consider the
danger that subsequent generations of politicians are not as honest as they
are. One of the checks and balances they might want to introduce is the
presence of mass media. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, my
analysis has shown that the Founding Fathers would have to do so if and
only if the temporal horizon of the society was large enough.
This …nding could also shed some light on the fact that some countries
have enjoyed considerable econmoic performance lately, although their po-
litical and media freedom was not as strong as conventional wisdom thought
it should have been.
39In this Section I have shown that the existence of an institutional player
with the role of releasing information does not improve citizens’ welfare in
general. I have stressed that this depends crucially on the media exercising
its supervising role only when it is optimal to do so. In fact I have shown
that there are cases when having more information might cause a decrease
in both players’ welfare with respect to the case when media is not available.
Of course this situation would not happen if citizens were able to commit ex-
ante not to have too much information. Similarly, scenarios when too much
information is harmful would not be an issue if the Constitution allowed
media to operate if and only if this would be optimal. However, if such a
commitment strategy is not possible or the Constitution fails to distinguish
cases where media are optimal from cases where they are not, a viable
alternative is to make corruption easier to happen and as a consequence
the information easier to be concealed. In the next section I am going to
show this.
6.2 Media is Available and Collusion is a Possibility
In the previous section I have seen that, thanks to the presence of media,
citizens can improve their welfare with respect to a situation where no media
is available. However I have warned that this relies on either i) the citizen
being able to refrain from using the media when its use might be welfare
increasing ex-post, but not ex-ante; or ii) the Constitution optimally distin-
guishing among environments when media are welfare improving and when
they are not.
I have stressed how this second assumption depends critically on the
citizen being able to commit not to use the media when using the media is
optimal ex-post but not ex-ante. I have also highlighted the di¢culties that
this commitment strategy implies.
In this section I want to extend the welfare analysis made previously
to the scenario where collusion between media and politician is possible.
The …ndings are similar to the ones in the previous section. In addition I
reach a surprising result: sometimes allowing corruption between media and
politician solves the issue of citizen’s commitment not to use the media and
as a consequence improves citizen’s welfare with respect to a situation when
no collusion is possible.
Summing up the results in Proposition 10, regarding politician’s equi-
librium strategy, I know that when ￿ 2
h





incumbent does not …nd it optimal to mimic the behaviour of the honest






given the not optimality on part of the dishonest incumbent to bribe the me-
dia and mimic the honest politician with this intermediate valuation of time,
a separating equilibrium is the outcome with probability (1 ￿ ￿)￿, i.e. the





40and ￿ > 1=2 the equilibrium outocme is a pooling equilibrium with media
and politician colluding and the citizen reelecting the incumbent with some
positive probability. As before the citizen …nds it optimal to have a pooling





As I did in the previous section, in every region of parameters ￿ I want
to compare incumbent’s equilibrium strategy to what would be the optimal
one with respect to the citizen’s expected utility.
[Insert Pictures 3, 4 and 5 about here]




uc(h)￿uc(d) = ￿citizen < ￿￿. Here when
￿ < ￿citizen, there is no alignment between politician and citizen: the former
reveals himself in equilibrium, while from the citizen’s viewpoint, the incum-




the politician takes the separating strategy which is
optimal for the citizen as well: there is no need on the introduction of media.





the introduction of media and
the use of its information is in the citizen’s interest, as media transmitting






the dishonest politician …nds it optimal to mimic
the honest one and to buy o¤ the silence of media by paying it the whole
amount ￿M. In this case there the existence of collusion represents a loss in
welfare for citizens with respect to the case where no collusion was possible.
A similar discussion can be made when ￿￿ 6 ￿citizen 6 ￿￿ + ￿M
T . The
only di¤erence in this environment is that there exists an intermediate range
of parameters ￿ 2
￿
￿￿;￿citizen￿
where the use of media could be possible in
such a way that citizens could get more information and induce the dishonest
politician to separate. However in this case doing so would be harmful ex-
ante: the optimal strategy for the citizen is to let the dishonest politician
mimic the honest one and deliver a pooling strategy equilibrium. However in
this circumstance the issue of citizen’s commitment not to resort to media
and/or of media not to enter the market arises. That is the reason why
benevolent and rational Founding Fathers would have to prevent or limit
the role of media in such circumstances.
Finally let us analyse the case where ￿￿ + ￿M
T < ￿citizen. When ￿ < ￿￿,
there is no alignment between bad incumbent and voter, since the voter
would like the incumbent to pool, while politicians optimal strategy is to re-





, although it would
be possible to induce more separation through the use of media, it is optimal
for citizens to have politicians pool on the strategy (￿￿;g￿): therefore also
in this case the introduction of media or having media to transmit politi-
cal news is not optimal for citizens’ expected welfare. Moreover, when ￿ 2 ￿
￿citizen;1
￿
, though optimal for her, again it is not possible to induce politi-
cians to separate through use of the media: given the incentive he is facing,
41for the dishonest incumbent it is optimal to mimic the honest one. Further-
more, should the signal arrive, the dishonest incumbent …nds it optimal to
buy the silence of the media.




: here the dishonest
politician’s optimal strategy is to collude with the media and to mimic the
honest politician behaviour. However, this is optimal from the citizen’s
viewpoint as well: in this case, allowing the collusion maximises citizen’s
welfare. As a conclusion, in this case, decreasing ￿ and/or M is the optimal
choice to adopt.
As I have said before it is a well known phenomenon in this class of
reelection games that citizen’s equilibrium strategies might su¤er from not
being sub-game perfect: it is optimal for the citizen ex-ante to commit not






. However, once the information has been received by the
media, it is optimal for the citizen to know it. Should the media anticipate
this, then it could be possible for them to release the information they
received and there could be a shift from a pooling equilibrium to a non-
optimal separating equilibrium. So in this case the optimal constitution
should be written in such a way as to not allow the media to transmit
information about political incumbents. Alternatively citizens should have
to credibly commit not to use any information the media would release.
However if the constitution is not written in an optimal way and/or the
citizen is unable to committ not to use any information, the existence of
collusion functions as a substitute for these failures.




the citizen can credibly commit not to acquire new information. If the in-
formation gets produced the citizen knows that it will not reach her, as the
politician would act in order to conceal it. Since for the citizen it is opti-
mal that the politicians pool, then allowing more collusion is optimal. In
this case, making the collusion easier by decreasing ￿ and/or M; is optimal,
contrary to the conclusions of the literature in this …eld. In fact decreasing
￿ and/or M will increase the range of parameters ￿ where a pooling equilib-
rium is optimal for both players and where the citizen can credibly committ






, where a pooling equilibrium is again
optimal but citizen’s commitment not to use the media is not credible and
collusion as a substitute device to both an imperfect Constitution and an
imperfect citizens committment does not work.
Again it is possible to derive the expression for the expected utility of
the citizen when the mass media is present and collusion is a possibility.
42Modifying the expression in eq.(12) this is equal to:
EU(￿￿
d;￿;￿￿
c;￿;￿m) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[H￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿uc(h)]+
+￿￿[H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
c￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+
+(1 ￿ ￿)￿[uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+
+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[￿((￿m(uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d)))+
+(1 ￿ ￿m)(H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
c￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))))+
+(1 ￿ ￿)((￿￿
d;￿(H
￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿(￿￿
cuc (d) + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d)))+
+(1 ￿ ￿￿
d;￿)(uc (d) + ￿ (￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))))]
where ￿m is the probability that, having received the signal s 2 f￿;?g
the incumbent reveals the truth, while 1 ￿ ￿m is the probability that the
incumbent suppresses the signal. Since the relevant case is when s = ￿,
in the expression above I consider only that case, since when s = ?, the
probability that the Incumbent reveals that signal, i.e. ￿m(?j?) = 1.
By comparing the expression above with the expression in eq. (12) one
can derive the condition such that the citizen’s utility when there is media
and the possibility of corruption is larger than the citizen’s utility when
there is no additional information coming from media.











(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿m[uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿m)[(1 ￿ ￿￿
d;￿)(uc (d) + ￿(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]+




￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿
cuc (d) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))
i
+




￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿
cuc (d) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))
i
+





[uc (d) + ￿ (￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))] >




￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
c￿uc (d) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))
i
)+
+(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿
d;￿)[uc (d) + ￿ (￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]













cuc (d) + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h) + (1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))]
43In the above expression the LHS represents the citizen’s utility when
the information is available, although there is some chance that it is con-
cealed. The RHS, instead, represents the total citizen’s utility when there
is not any information available through media. It is easy to notice that the






Finally, it is easy to verify that the same algeabriac manipulation leads
to conclude that the citizens’utility when mass media is around and collusion
is a possibility is larger than citizens’ utility when there is no possibility of
collusion if and only the welfare coming from disciplining the incumbent is









cuc (d)+(1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(￿uc(h)+(1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))] > uc (d)+￿(￿uc(h)+(1 ￿ ￿)uc (d))
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have extended the previous literature about the political econ-
omy of mass media by analysing how a citizen’s voting decision and collusion
between the media and politicians change when two pieces of information
about politician’s type are available: a media signal and observation of the
public good. By using both the two signals, I have shown that citizens man-
age to sort an honest politician from a dishonest one more often than if they
were relying on media information only. Moreover, I have shown that the
use of both signals makes collusion harder to take place. Furthermore, in
this paper I have taken a departure from most of the exisisting literature.
In previous works voters have quite a passive role towards information. In
this work I have started endogenising citizens’ information acquisition and I
have shown how this decision depends critically on the time discount factor
between the two periods. By using media in an active way the citizen can
decide whether to use information if and only if this increases her expected
utility. I have highlighted that there is a certain region of time discount
factor between the two periods where it is optimal ex-ante for the citizen
to commit not to acquire information about the incumbent. However, it is
a well known result that there is a tension between optimality ex-ante and
optimality ex-post. Even though for the voter it may be optimal ex-ante
to commit not to use any information, once the new information is avail-
able, it is optimal for her to use it. This argument might make for unstable
equilibria where the voter commits ex-ante to a sort of “rational and strate-
gic ignorance”. On the other hand I have conjectured that, if the citizen’s
commitment not to acquire information is not possible, the existence and
easing of collusion might contribute, by concealing informative signals, to
44increase citizen’s utility ex-ante. I judge this a surprising and novel result
which contradicts most of the …ndings of the literature in this new but very
interesting …eld of the research in political economy.
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Figure 5: Collusion is Possible
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